Beijing's Asian Aspirations

BEIJING. The Presidential Reception Room in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square. Time: 4.30 pm on September 4. President Jiang Zemin was sitting at the apex of a horse shoe arrangement of chairs, flanked on his left by members of the Executive Committee of the National People's Consultative Committee of the People's Republic of China. Along the right hand curve of the horse shoe were Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Take-shita, former prime minister of Japan, Helmut Schmidt, former chancellor of Germany, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former secretaries of state of the US, A.P. Lukin, Chairman, International Affairs Committee of the Duma of the Russian Federation, General Mirza Aslam Beg, former army chief of Pakistan, Alain Peyrefitte, chairman of the Editorial Board of Le Figaro of France, and last, yours truly.

Jiang was receiving the senior political participants invited from about 40 countries (five from Europe and North America and 35 from Asia) in an international conference organised by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference under the umbrella of the '21st Century Forum'. The theme of the conference was 'China and Asia in the 21st Century'. Jiang told his visitors that the world is going through qualitative transitions in the spheres of science, technology and economic development which, in turn, will impact on political equations between countries.

He emphasised that the prospect of coping with the 21st century entails shared international concerns requiring serious studies of the complex and changing international situation which should lead to structuring of policies and mutual relations to create a stable world order. He then invited opinions from the senior guests on the prospects for Asian countries in the 21st century, the role they visualised for China and their respective countries in managing the challenges of the 21st century.

What fascinated me was Jiang's confi-dence in the centrality of China in Asian and global affairs. The reactions of Lee Kuan Yew, Schmidt et al were characterised by an acknowledgement of this. It was noteworthy that throughout the one-hour meeting Jiang's demeanour was moderate, thoughtful and non-assertive, at the same time underlining the fact that China would be the main politico-strategic factor in Asian resurgence in the 21st century.

Earlier that morning Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng inaugurated the conference, announcing to the participants that "to Asia and the entire world, the rise of Asia is good news". He elaborated the Chinese assessment as to why it is good news. First, that Asian political traditions and culture have always contributed to world peace. Secondly, a stronger Asia will further the processes towards a multi-polar world instead of a uni-polar world. The rise of Asia will give a fresh impetus to the development of the world economy and to robust economic growth in the Asian region itself. He added that the rise of Asia will have a positive infl-uence for developing countries to step up their search for developmental processes suitable to their own conditions and rooted in their own traditions. Lastly, the rise of Asia will mean the end of the old international political and economic order which was "unjust and irrational". The more sig-nificant part of his inaugural speech was that nearly half of it recounted China's economic and technological achievements and stressed Chinese capabilities of playing a critical role in Asian resurgence.

The conference was from September 2-7. The national and professional antecedents of the foreign participants reflected careful planning by the organisers to reach out to influential figures in countries which are of high priority to China, namely, the US, ASEAN, Japan, Russia, Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan (in that order). The spheres of influence of each of the foreign invitees in their respective countries also reflected the areas of bilateral and multilateral relations which China wished to emphasise. One saw the highest level of multidimensional representation from ASEAN, Japan, the US and Germany. Invitees from Canada, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia were specialists in economic relations and strategic affairs. General Beg's presence indicated China's continuing interest in nurturing a strategic security equation with Pakistan. The invitation to me was basically in the context of China's desire to sustain the gradual process of normalisation of bilateral relations with India. It is relevant to note that there were no representatives from Central Asia, the Gulf or West Asia. Nearly 70 papers were presented at the conference; there was a wide-ranging discussion on the entire spectrum of political, economic, strategic and technological concerns. The Chinese organisers kept to their promise of ensuring a frank exchange of views abjuring any inclination of structuring the discussions in controlled conditions.

IT was clear that China's focus of attention is and will remain on the Asia-Pacific region. A matter of equal priority, articulated by Chinese participants was establishing equations with the US, Russia and Japan so that they do not affect China's interests negatively. Chinese strategic planners participating in the conference uniformly questioned the relevance of the US-Japan security treaty and even argued that in the changed international situation, it is a relic of the Cold War and can be a factor of tensions in the Far East. This evoked an immediate response from George Schultz that China should carefully reassess these views, because the abrogation of the US-Japan security treaty which was renewed by Clinton recently, could revive Japanese militarism.

Participants from the ASEAN region sought clarifications from the Chinese about their territorial claims in the South China Sea, and their intention to expand their politico-military influence and footholds in countries stretching from Myanmar to the Philippines. The Chinese response was brief and to the point: China is irrevocably and firmly committed to opposing any kind of hegemonism, China's territorial claims in the adjacent seas are principled and are based on historical evidence and China would settle these claims by political dialogue without the use of force.바카라 웹사이트

When issues about respect for human rights, China's non-inclusion in the WTO and matters related to environment management came up for discussion, the Chinese stance was nationalistic and Asia-centric. Li Peng's inaugural remarks provided the framework for these Chinese advocacies. He said that where issues related to human rights and such matters are concerned, the world at large should respect the diversity of Asian countries and their socio-political traditions. It is not for outsiders to stipulate standards. He added that if some issues were intractable, they must be shelved for the time being, bearing in mind the long-term interest of the peoples of Asia. He emphasised that the establishment of a regional security cooperation arrangement should be based on 'Asian realities' and implied that this should not be structured on the basis of the interests of non-Asian powers.

Chinese participants were clear in their mind that there was no contradiction between the one party regime in China and the extensive programme of economic liberalisation which China is engaged in. They also accepted the dilemma of having to control the democratic impulses which could be generated due to economic liber-alisation, but when cogitating with them on these issues over cups of coffee and swirling tobacco smoke, their individual reaction was that they will cross these bridges when they come to it.

India appears on their radar screen as a large and important neighbour. For the present they do not visualise India as too influ-ential a strategic or economic factor in Asian developments. The approach to India is that they must have a good working relationship and that India should not become the base for any separatist activities in Tibet against them. There was no analysis or speculation about an equation between China and India becoming a galvanising factor in Asian resurgence. For now, the Chinese indicated that they are sufficient unto themselves to become the focal point for Asia's emergence on the stage of the world as far as China could have appropriate equations with the US, Japan and Russia.

The question which remained in my mind as I left Beijing was whether the rest of Asia accepts this prospect entirely, and even more important, can one talk of Asia in the 21st century without involving the Gulf, the Central Asian and West Asian regions. The conference did not have answers to these questions, but the remaining years of this decade may have some indicative responses.