Missed Train To Tashkent

UZBEKISTAN has a special place in my political consciousness. Historically, it was a major transit point on the trade routes between China and India; and the Mughal period of Indian history began from Andijan in the Ferghana Valley (Babar originated from here). There's another India connection, albeit a less pleasant one. Timur, the Uzbeks' national icon who had led numerous expeditions to India, is from here too. After the Soviet collapse, a statue was erected in his memory in the heart of Tashkent.

Uzbekistan's geo-strategic and economic importance in Central Asia dawned on me during my stint as India's ambassador to Afghanistan. It was then that I understood the relevance of forging ties with Uzbekistan so that both Indians and Uzbeks would benefit.

This was my third visit to Uzbekistan since the mid-'80s. The Uzbek government and our embassy in Tashkent enabled me to meet senior Uzbek leaders and academics and also to visit Khiva and Urgench in the north-eastern province of Khworajm.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, there are a host of things happening in Uzbekistan of which three developments should be of special interest to India: the post-Soviet Uzbek endeavour to forge a distinct national identity; the Uzbek aim to define its new geo-strategic position in Central Asian politics; the motivations animating its South Asian policies.

Before going into the impressions I gathered during my week-long visit, it would be pertinent to mention the geo-political and economic significance of Uzbekistan. With a geographical area of 447,400 square kms, it is the largest Central Asian country after Kazakhstan. And with a population of 23.5 million people, it is demographically the most important. Having frontiers with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, it is a focal point in Central Asian politics.

Uzbekistan has tremendous economic potential too. It is endowed with natural gas, petroleum, gold, coal, uranium, silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and molybdenum. It has a large market hungry for investments, human resources training, technology, economic restructuring and modernisation. Barring perhaps Kazakhstan, it has the most pluralistic ethnic society—though Uzbeks form the majority, there are Russians, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Tartars and Karakalpaks among Uzbek citizens. Though it has a Sunni Muslim majority, there are some Eastern orthodox Christians. To give a sample of its diversity—there's even a "Hare Krishna" community. Most significantly, Uzbekistan has one of the highest literacy rates in the region at 97 per cent, with female literacy pegged at an awesome 96 per cent.

It is in this backdrop that the government of President Islam Karimov is trying to shape Uzbekistan's new national agenda. His main tasks will be to first disengage from the political and linguistic connections with Russia, to diversify economic contacts subject to the limitation of not being able to break away completely from Russian strategic links, and to forge a secular political society where Islam's importance is acknowledged, but not taken to extremes.

Dr Rustam Kasymov, dean of the Academy of State and Social Reconstruction, told me that Uzbek society is aiming at reviving its pre-Soviet traditional identity with a strong desire to emerge as a modern state with contemporary political, cultural and economic terms of reference. This exercise is subject to contradictory pulls from Islamic groups, and the present power structure which insists on secularism, not only because it's a reasonable thing to do but because if it wants to retain power, that's the most sensible path to tread.

Uzbeks are conscious of their political and economic importance in Central Asia. But they are landlocked. With Tajikistan and Afghanistan suffering from civil strife, and with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan being the target of strategic and economic influence from the West led by the US, Uzbekistan craves for political and economic attention of the West. It also wants to counter any threats to its territorial integrity from Tajikistan and seeks an opening to the sea at Karachi.

OFFICIALS of the Strategic Institute and the Foreign Office feel that Uzbekistan consolidating its geostrategic position in Central Asia is subject to competitive and contradictory pressures born of the turmoil in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and crosscurrents of other external involvements in the region. They feel that a regional consensus to stabilise the situation, guaranteed by Russia, the US and the UN, is necessary if Uzbekistan has to establish its regional importance.

As for Uzbekistan's South Asia policies, Uzbek foreign minister Abdul Azis Kamilov emphasised the highest importance Uzbekistan attaches to respecting the territorial integrity of all the Central Asian Republics. He says Uzbekistan wants a political resolution of Tajikistan's civil strife, as it may have implications on its own stability. He feels that the UN should play a key role in bringing about a political settlement in Afghanistan and that the first step should be a Security Council-imposed embargo on the flow of arms and related material to various Afghan groups. According to Kamilov, the new power structure in Afghanistan should be based on participation by all ethnic groups and all possible military factions including the Taliban.

The think-tank feels Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia should support the Uzbek approach. The most important reason why Uzbekistan seeks stability in Afghanistan and a good relationship with Pakistan is that it will enable Uzbekistan to have access to the port of Karachi. And facilitate the long-term, economically beneficial, exploitation of natural gas and other mineral resources of Central Asia which, in turn, will benefit South Asia as well.

But a disturbing development could throw a spanner in the works—certain extremist Islamic organisations in Pakistan are training Uzbek youth from the Ferghana valley in Wahabism and in armed combat. Kamilov recently issued a statement, accusing these Pakistani organisations of generating subversive and terrorist trends in Uzbekistan, infiltrating

members into the country through Tajikistan and Kyrgyztan. He asserted that the ultimate aim of these activities is to train fanatic followers of extremist religious ideology to destabilise Uzbekistan and subvert its constitutional system. This indicates that Pakistani-Saudi extremist organisations are not only creating trouble in Jammu and Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tajikistan but now also in Uzbekistan.

Interestingly, Kamilov clarifies in the statement that the "Pakistani government has no knowledge of these activities"—the concern being not to create any misunderstanding with the Pakistan government.

The Uzbeks deliberately differentiate between the government of Pakistan and the activities of Pakistan-based extremist Islamic organisations because they obviously don't want bad equations with a country that can give them access to a port.

As far as India is concerned, there is a genuine interest in expanding cultural, economic and technological ties. Yusopov, governor of the distant Khworajm province, pointed out that these are spheres where India can be of immense assistance to the Uzbek people. His counterparts in Tashkent stress the importance of the large Uzbek market and Uzbekistan's expectations about Indian cooperation in developing their economy, upgrading their trained manpower resources and technologies. On the cultural side, I was pleasantly surprised to find Uzbek scholars translating the Mahabharata and the poetry of Malik Mohammad Jayasi and Amir Khusro. I was also told of the creative activities of the Indian Cultural Centre at Tashkent despite its limited resources, which has evoked interest in Uzbek's cultural circles.

One also noticed that Uzbekistan does not envisage any special political or strategic equation with India. Uzbekistan's attention is focused on Pakistan in terms of its national interests. One reason for this, I can say from my professional memory, is the fact that the political overtures of president Karimov to India between 1991 and 1994 did not evoke sufficient meaningful responses from New Delhi. And since 1996, there has been a drift in relations. This was an opportunity missed, because it would be relevant to remember that contacts and cooperation with Uzbekistan are important if we desire a rational settlement of the Afghan situation which would not be subject to extremist orientations. This is apart from the potential of mutually beneficial economic and technological relations.