The selective butchering of 26 Hindu men in front of the eyes of their women and children at the Baisaran Maidan near Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, is a terrible tragedy, and one that demands harsh retaliation. Much has already been written—both sensible and nonsensical—on the incident, and will not bear repetition here. Despite the enormity of the incident, it is useful to recall that the selective targeting of Hindus is far from unprecedented in the 35 years of the Pakistan-backed Islamist jihad in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Indeed, the movement commenced with the selective targeting of Hindus in 1988, provoking the flight of about 100,000 Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley through 1989-90. Hindus and other minorities, frequently selectively targeted, have been a significant proportion of the 15,290 civilian fatalities inflicted in the state by terrorists from 1988 till April 24, 2025 (South Asia Terrorism Portal data).
Pahalgam Terror Attack: Is War An Option ?
The sheer uncertainty and costs of war, present levels of preparedness and the nuclear balance discount war as a rational option for India, certainly at the present stage
Each major terrorist attack provokes large volumes of often uninformed commentary about “strategic shifts” and “changing patterns of terrorism” in J&K. But the jihad in J&K is a protracted state-sponsored conflict that has endured for over 35 years, and it has seen innumerable tactical adaptations on both sides, with security forces (SFs) and terrorists jockeying relentlessly for advantage. This has also been an age of dramatic technological transformation, and both sides have sought to harness emerging technologies. Crucially, however, on both sides, strategic objectives and postures have remained unchanged.
Understanding Pakistan Army's stance
This, indeed, is what makes much of the commentary on Pakistan라이브 바카라 Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir라이브 바카라 speech—most commentators have chosen the descriptive ‘rant’—quite so incomprehensible. Many ‘experts’ have interpreted this speech, delivered on April 16 to a group of overseas Pakistanis, as a direct incitement of the Baisaran Maidan incident. But terrorism in J&K did not begin on April 22, nor is there any element of novelty in a single idea articulated by Munir. The commentary has been fixated on his assertion that Kashmir is and will remain Pakistan라이브 바카라 jugular vein, but this is something hundreds of military and political leaders have articulated again and again over the decades. Indeed, General Pervez Musharraf—who has many admirers in India, and with whom a previous Bharatiya Janata Party government had entered into negotiations over Kashmir—used this phrase on more than one occasion. Another element of Munir라이브 바카라 speech that has rankled in India is his repeated quotations from the Qur’an, which is taken as evidence of his ‘fanatical and extremist’ mindset. But there are many Indian leaders, including top military officers, both serving and retired, who have made it an increasing practice to quote from the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, the Vedas or other Hindu texts: are we to draw comparable conclusions regarding their mentality as well? The problem is, with little by way of information or intelligence to go on, many commentators have sought to re-invent themselves as mind readers, and seduce the gullible among us with their inventions about what Munir is thinking and planning.
Munir was, of course, the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the time of the Pulwama attack, which killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel in February 2019—and that provoked the Balakot air strike. The Army Chief at that time, however, was General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who is supposed to have adopted a ‘soft’ doctrine on the Kashmir issue, and towards India.
It needs to be understood clearly that there have been nine chiefs of army staff in Pakistan since 1988, and not one has diluted the strategic commitment to what is conceptualised as the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir. The trajectory of terrorism has seen many ups and downs in this interregnum, but Munir is not an oddity; he reflects the continued dedication of the Pakistan Army to pursue the annexation of J&K through all possible instruments—principally through proxy terrorism. To pretend that Munir is somehow the beginning of a new strategic orientation or posture is to ignore not just 35 years of terrorism, but 78 years of relentless Pakistani conspiracies and efforts to this end.
There is a widespread perception that the Indian Government is now under extraordinary pressure to do something dramatic in retaliation to the Baisaran Maidan outrage—‘all-out war’ and surgical strikes are the two options preferred by the more hysterical TV anchors and social media warriors. This pressure can only be further augmented by public statements by various top leaders, including the Prime Minister, promising extraordinary vengeance. It would be most unfortunate, and unproductive, if perceived public pressure is allowed to determine, or even influence, the Government라이브 바카라 decision on this count.
India's Long-Term Options
The sheer uncertainty and costs of war, present levels of preparedness, the nuclear balance and the regional threat environment discount war as a rational option for India, certainly at the present stage. Past ‘surgical strikes’ have had dubious success. Critically, their deterrent value in the long-term is suspect. One-off incidents, particularly where Pakistan can mount comparable—or occasionally superior—retaliation, are unlikely to end Pakistan라이브 바카라 sponsorship of terrorism.
Given Pakistan라이브 바카라 enduring obsession with the ‘Kashmir issue’, it is imperative that India design a strategy within the context of a protracted conflict, which seeks to ‘erode the strengths and exploit the vulnerabilities’ of the adversary system. India is, today, uniquely positioned to execute such a strategy. For one thing, the world라이브 바카라 past ‘tolerance of terrorism’ has now diminished, and most major countries, including those of the West, have not only issued strong messages of condemnation in the wake of the Baisaran Maidan incident, they have expressed support for punitive measures New Delhi may adopt.
Importantly, Pakistan is in an extraordinarily vulnerable position: its economy is in disarray, its politics fractious, its environment and resources stressed, unemployment and poverty rising, the value of the rupee evaporating, the credibility of the Army—long rock solid—crumbling, multiple insurgencies bleed the SFs, and ethnic and sectarian conflicts undermine the idea of Pakistan and the foundations of the two-nation theory, in every province.
Against this backdrop, of the five retaliatory measures already announced by the Indian Government, the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty has the most significant potential for impact, if the present and successive governments demonstrate an unshakeable will to stand by the underlying strategy. It has been widely noted that this measure is unlikely to have any immediate impact, but if India is able, over the years, to diminish the flow of unutilised waters to Pakistan—already one of the most water-stressed countries in the world—even by small percentages, this would have a crippling impact on economics, politics and conflict in the country.
A wide range of covert instrumentalities—including but not restricted to kinetic operations—can enormously deepen Pakistan라이브 바카라 existing vulnerabilities and undermine the residual strengths and capabilities of the national system and institutions. While it is not appropriate to discuss, in any significant detail, the possible instrumentalities that could be exploited, broadly, these could include, inter alia, crippling military competition short of war, leveraging of the widening economic and technological gap between the two countries, cyber operations, and the lighting and fanning of small political fires wherever possible.
Crucially, these are, and must be, covert operations—and would not provide the theatrical ‘victories’ that the present Indian regime seeks for partisan political advantage. The most effective measures against Pakistan, consequently, offer the least partisan political gain for the ruling party in India.
(Views expressed are personal)
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute For Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal
This article is part of 바카라라이브 바카라 May 11, 2025 issue, covering the Pahalgam terror attack and the old wounds it has reopened. It appeared in print as ‘Is War An Option?'