Guehenno's socio-political astrology has been accurate during the fin de siecle we are witnessing. India had to, and has changed both the ideological and operational terms of reference of its foreign policy over the last five years. Not only to adjust to the post-Cold War power equations and economic globalisation, but also to meet the challenges of economic want, terrorism, mass migrations and crime—all equally permeating global phenomena unrestrained by national boundaries or governments.
The last months of 1994 and early 1995 saw us in a bind over a range of issues. Relations with Pakistan showed a rising curve of hostility. Bangladesh accentuated tensions by deciding to inter-nationalise the Ganga water issue. We continued to face the impact of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In Nepal, instability and domestic political strife led to a revival of phobias about India. The US and other advanced countries stepped up pressure on us to toe their line on the content and speed of our liberalisa-tion plans, on the new—and discriminatory—regimes being initiated on transfer and development of high technology, and on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Internal turbulence and uncertain foreign policies of, among others, China and Russia, brought difficulties in our relations with them. Though there were no overt threats to our territorial integrity and security, covert threats persisted through violent, secessionist subversion in Kashmir and the north-eastern states.
At the same time, the momentum of economic aspects of our foreign policy slowed down due to electoral politics and the populist tactics of opposition parties. This, in turn, affected the credibility of our reforms. Though the World Trade Organisation came into existence in early 1995, protectionist stipulations set by advanced countries under the pretext of social and human considerations affected India's trading potentialities. Multilateral fora like the Non-Aligned Movement and G-15 became progressively irrelevant. Developments in West Asia, Bosnia, Central Asia, East Europe and Russia drew increasing international political attention, proportionately marginalising India as an area of interest.
This is the context in which Prime Minister Narasimha Rao had to work out his Government's priorities and foreign policy. The main concerns and consequent objectives were obvious. We had to effectively counter the entire range of political, military and paramilitary subversive activities threatening India's unity and territorial integrity. Superpower and international political pressure on us to compromise on these issues had to be firmly resisted. We had to nurture and sustain defence and national security in an adverse, if not hostile, environment. We had to ensure our freedom of options for defence preparedness, nuclear and space technology, and safeguard our potentialities for technological self-reliance and growth. Our international economic credibility and external fiscal credit rating had to be maintained, while at the same time meeting the imperative requirement of distributive social justice.
On balance, we have safeguarded our unity and territorial integrity despite the threats we still face. But we have only coped with the external dimensions of this problem, while internal turmoil and contradictions which external forces are taking advantage of remain unresolved. Our economic credibility has been affected because of the ambiguities which characterised our internal economic decision-making process and the manner in which they affected foreign investments and projects in India. Despite a measure of continuity in our economic reforms and restructuring, economic performance has fallen short of our own expectations.
The indefinite extension of the biased NPT was a setback, but we did not succumb to the pressure generated by this event. The interim tactical measures taken in 1991-95 to safeguard our nuclear and space technology development options left us with the necessary flexibility to fashion firm stances against superpower hegemony. US media reports saying India is in the process of carrying out a major nuclear test and subsequent official comments confirm this assessment. We also reverted to some of our negative stances on issues like CTBT, fissile material cut-off, and MTCR with adroitness, though it increased our isolation. However, Rao remains ambiguous on developing the options we possess, which is not politic as we will not be able to exercise them in the face of further restrictive regimes and provisions for punitive actions against non-conforming states likely to be put in place by 1996-end.
Ties with all our neighbours—barring Bhutan and the Maldives—remain subject to potential tensions. Pakistan falls in a comparatively hopeless category for now, but initiatives to resolve issues with Bangladesh and Nepal remain tenuous and half-hearted. We have stabilised relations with Sri Lanka, but if the conflict continues, it can get us re-involved due to Tamil Nadu politics. Conferring the Jawaharlal Nehru Award on Aung San Suu Kyi, while laudable in moral terms, has created tensions with Myanmar which we should have avoided in our larger security and strategic interests.
While our relations with the UK and West Europe stayed on an even keel, political uncertainties here and our attitude towards the foreign economic environment have reduced European interest in India. Our relations with the US too have suffered despite the upswing in economic ties. Washington's restoration of arms supplies to Pakistan, its temporising on the Kashmir issue and its caution on technology transfer to India have combined to revive doubts and suspicions about the US in Indian public perceptions. Our relations with Central Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe did not show forward movement mainly because of their own internal con-flicts. As for China, a purposive solution to the substantive boundary question remains only a distant possibility. The turmoil in Tibet, the controversy between the Dalai Lama and Beijing on the nomination of the Panchen Lama and China's politico-strategic aspirations in South-east Asia can lead to future tensions with India.
Indian initiatives to expand relations with South Africa and major South American nations, primarily through visits by our President and Prime Minister to South America, showed a revival of Indian interest in these regions. It would be reasonable to expect more tangible, economic and cultural relations with them, though politically the European and North American linkages of African and South American countries will result in divergences between Indian orientations and their attitudes on various issues.
Our relations with the ASEAN countries and Japan remained focused on economic cooperation, as these countries have their reservations about India's stand on political and security issues. Our attempts to seek full partnership in the political and security arrangements being planned by these countries, despite being aware of these reservations, also affected our credibility.
The Prime Minister took part in three important multilateral summits, G-15, NAM and the 50th UN General Assembly session, where he made a sober and realistic, though unsuccessful, attempt to reorient their roles to meet changing world realities. We have repeatedly claimed a permanent seat on the Security Council during this year, but given our refusal to sign the NPT, our basic differences on a number of global issues with the five permanent council members and our marginal economic role in financing the UN, the chances are slim. India assumed the SAARC chairmanship in early March and, despite the inter-state controversies and regional tensions, the South Asia preferential trade arrangement has been put in place, and projects and programmes of cooperation have moved from discussion to implementation stage.
The period also witnessed the emergence of infrastructural and ideological aberrations in our national psyche. That our foreign policy is no longer backed up by national cohesion was sharply brought out by the contradictory statements issued by Ambassador S.S. Ray on the one hand and Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjeex on the other when the Hank Brown Amendment restoring arms supplies to Pakistan was passed by the US Senate.
Foreign policy performance cannot be subject to statistical grading or academic evaluation. But looking back on what India might or might not have achieved, one comes to two conclusions. First, that our foreign policy was in the doldrums of international uncertainties. Second, that while we may not have notched up any sig-nificant or spectacular policy successes, Rao has managed to cope with a world in continuing ferment.
