A바카라 웹사이트 day after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was passed by an overwhelming majority of 158 to 3 in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns cautioned India and other countries who opposed the treaty against conducting any nuclear tests against the "will of the international community and the great powers of the world". The arrogance of this statement could not be missed.
The voting on September 10 saw India, Bhutan and Libya opposing it. There were five abstentions—Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, Tanzania and Mauritius. The treaty will now be opened for signatures in a few weeks. If it is not ratified within the next three years by the 44 countries which have nuclear reactors, including India, a conference will be called to suggest measures to accelerate the ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. Pakistan, which voted for the treaty, has announced that it will not sign until India does so— a la the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).
The easy passage of the treaty—it was moved as a resolution by Australia and co-sponsored by 126 other countries—has brought full circle the whole issue of getting a country to be a party to it when it is strongly opposed to it. India had blocked the draft CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, in August. The nuclear weapon states were determined to get the treaty through, arguing that it was too valuable to be allowed to be blocked after two years of negotiations. Therefore, the Australian resolution, in the form of an 'information document', under which no amendments could be moved.
But amidst all the self-congratulations for having stood up to the world powers, no one seems to have stopped to examine where Indian diplomacy went wrong in the negotiations on the CTBT. It is time to assess how India got into this situation, whereby it ended up voting with Libya, after having twice co-sponsored, in 1993 and 1994, the resolutions calling for conclusion of the CTBT and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). As an Indian diplomat remarked some time ago: "We didn't con the US into believing that we would sign the CTBT. We actually conned ourselves."
Both the Indian official delegate at the UNGA, Arundhati Ghose, and Permanent Representative to the UN Prakash Shah, denounced the treaty.
The question now being asked is whether not come into force three years from the time it is opened for signatures. Says Raja Mohan, defence analyst with The Hindu : "That would depend on the political assessment the world makes about India's strength. If India is strong, it may not face sanctions, but if it is assessed to be weak, it may come under pressures." He feels that the next three years will see New Delhi being encouraged, coerced or cajoled into join the treaty. "But there is a flip side to this. You have a three-year window which is defined very clearly. India can do something in these three years."바카라 웹사이트
Nicholas Burns' foot-in-the-mouth statement was followed by President Bill Clinton who, referring to India holding out against the treaty, said: "I believe we can find a way for the Indians to have their security concerns met". This created some confusion in India. What did he mean? Did he mean that an environment will be created to meet India's security concerns or did he mean that the US would provide guarantees to meet those concerns?
A State Department official, speaking on strict background, told 바카라 on September 12: "The President has used this phrase or phrases like this before. It is very clear to us. He has not said the US will meet India's security concerns, which is how a section of the Indian press has reported it.... There has been a lot of misinterpretation. It was meant to be a general sort of a statement."바카라 웹사이트
He said a security guarantee by the US would not be received favourably by India. "It would mean bending to accept the protection of the US. The recipient has to be confident that whosoever offers it will back it up. Is the US willing to subject itself to nuclear attack to protect India? I doubt it."바카라 웹사이트
With the CTBT through, the next challenge for India is the FMCT and the Strengthening of Safeguards. The FMCT seeks to stop the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The safeguards regime of the IAEA will deal with those states that are members of the NPT, but the way the non-proliferation and disarmament measures are going, even countries not members of the NPT may be brought under the safeguards at some date. These two alternative routes being sought could be used to cap India's nuclear programme.
