Looking back at the 2025 Delhi assembly elections, one comes across the issues that supposedly played a role in shaping people라이브 바카라 voting choices. While there were several issues, like in the case of every election, two issues receive attention as they go beyond this particular election and have larger implications for India라이브 바카라 democratic polity, which is federal in nature. The first issue is related to the political culture of freebies, which thrives on patronage and clientelism. The second issue is related to the asymmetrical federal design of the Union Territory of Delhi, which comes in the way of an elected government administering effectively.
Political Culture Of Freebies
In the recent assembly elections held in the states of Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Telangana, Jharkhand and Maharashtra, among others, the contestant parties competed with each other to garner votes by entering into competitive populism. Promises were made even when the economy of the concerned state was known to be in a precarious state, which was often the case. The CSDS-Lokniti post-poll surveys have shown that freebies in the form of direct cash transfer or free/subsidised access to public goods and services do create immediate voter appeal, especially among underprivileged voters. The surveys also show that in recent decades, socially and economically marginal groups and women also vote in large percentages, though they seldom vote as marginalised, as social cleavages take over.
It has been argued, backed by CSDS post-poll surveys, that the AAP electoral success in the 2015 and 2020 assembly elections was primarily due to its government providing subsidised public utilities and goods for marginal segments of society. Respondents belonging to lower classes, especially UP-Bihar migrants, Muslims, and Dalits, reported voting overwhelmingly for the party in both these elections. The party promised freebies this time also, in fact, at a much larger scale. However, as has now become the trend, the other contestant parties, especially the BJP, surpassed the AAP in offering the freebies. AAP while messaging to people about its government라이브 바카라 work in the education and health sectors. The AAP government also provided free public transportation to women, free healthcare and medicines in Mohalla Clinics, and water and electricity waivers. This time, it promised to implement Mahila Samman Yojana, under which women were to receive 2,100 rupees per month. Under Pujari Granthi Samman Yojana, temple priests and gurdwara granthis were to receive 18,000 rupees every month. In response, the BJP, while promising to continue all the ongoing schemes, also promised 21,000 rupees to give nutritional support for pregnant women under the Matru Suraksha Vandana scheme. It also promised 2,500 rupees monthly to women under Mahila Samridhi Yojana. Poor women were to receive one free gas cylinder on the occasion of Holi and Diwali. Similarly, the Congress promised the Pyari Didi Yojana, offering 2,500 rupees per month to women, along with a universal health insurance plan covering up to 25 lakh rupees for Delhi residents.
One can argue that the AAP failed to win the assembly elections for the third time because the Delhi electorate, acting like rational voters, preferred the BJP to the AAP, as the BJP, being in power at the centre, was viewed in a comparatively better position to fulfil its poll promises, which were more lucrative also. As for the middle and upper classes, the support for the “niche” party, which came out of the Anna-led movement, vowing to fight corruption in high places, was dented much earlier under the “Modi wave”. The recent allegation of the AAP top leaders’ involvement in corrupt practices, going back on its lofty promises of clean and no-frills politics, and the lavish official residence of the chief minister further disenchanted the tax-paying urban middle classes of the metropolitan city, who have no love lost for freebies.
As the Lokniti post-poll survey of 2025 showed that even socially and economically marginal communities, considered traditional voters of the AAP in Delhi, voted in large percentages for the BJP also. Arguably, these voters doubted the AAP's ability to deliver on the sops, as its top leaders are caught in the legal wrangles and are facing the possibility of being imprisoned again. They, of course, also might have weighed in on the AAP government라이브 바카라 failure in Punjab to fulfil its poll promises, especially the cash transfers to women, constantly reminded by both the BJP and Congress, both parties, otherwise adversaries, intent this time on decimating the 2012 party to make it a direct contest in the future, not only in Delhi but possibly in Punjab also.
The Delhi election has again drawn attention to the now widely entrenched political culture of freebies, which has taken usage of patronage and clientelism, always present in an electoral democracy, to an ominous level. While transient populist schemes, some of them mentioned above, if implemented on the ground, do provide quick relief to the poor and mitigate the hardships of poverty, there is always a question mark about their long-term impact in eradicating poverty by providing enabling opportunity structures. Parties in power, handing out the incremental doses of freebies, tend to neglect the underlying long-term structural issues responsible for the widespread poverty and inequality. They risk being superficial remedies and fail to improve the long-term social and economic conditions of the poor.
The largesse, which passes on as welfare measures, needs to be integrated with planned development, which would require long-term investment of public resources in the primary sector like education, health, infrastructure, and employment generation, something which southern states did with much success and are reaping the benefits of now. Over-reliance on short-term incentives by vote-seeking parties obscures the urgency of structural reforms and makes parties complacent as they look forward to using state resources recklessly to hand out doles when elections are round the corner. Cash transfer is, in any case, much easier than taking up long-term measures, which require appropriate policymaking and efforts to implement them on the ground effectively. To make it worse, these populist schemes are often personalised in the form of “guarantees” in the name of the party leader, promoting person-centred leadership, to the detriment of intra-party democracy.
Welfare economics suggests that policy effectiveness is context-dependent. In urban spaces like Delhi, with chronic deprivation and large-scale inequality, short-term incentives like cash handouts may serve only as stopgap measures. Without parallel investments in the creation of infrastructure and human capital, these measures are unlikely to produce lasting improvements. Electoral strategies must, therefore, prioritise both immediate welfare and long-term development to address the multifaceted challenges faced by the urban poor, many living in unauthorised colonies and slums, or on the street. The parties need to realise that electorates’ behaviour, particularly amongst marginalised communities, sooner or later reflects a demand for accountability and lasting welfare over transient benefits. Now, the incumbent BJP government has the onerous task of fulfilling all the populist promises, which would be a difficult task.
Asymmetrical Federal Design: Governance Issues
The AAP's failure to retain power was also attributed to the inability of its government to execute its long-term poll promises, like cleaning the Yamuna, improving the infrastructure, building the roads, streamlining the traffic, managing the drainage system, and mitigating pollution. Admittedly, the AAP government did some commendable work in the primary health and school education sectors, but here again, providing quality education in government schools and making available essential medicines in mohalla clinics remained the issues of contention. The CSDS post-poll survey data showed growing dissatisfaction among voters over issues like cleanliness, drinking water access, road conditions, and sewer drainage.
The AAP, on its part, whenever it faced criticism over the governance challenges, blamed it on the unique legal-constitutional status of Delhi. The office of the centrally appointed lieutenant governor also came under scrutiny for allegedly not allowing the government to work by stalling the files and encouraging officials not to implement the order. This needs a close look at the asymmetrical federal design that applies to Delhi and to examine the veracity of the AAP claim.
Delhi라이브 바카라 unique legal-constitutional status goes back to independence. Like in any other independent federal country, with Delhi being the national capital city, its government has always been tasked to undertake specific functions to assist the Union Government in fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities, including the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, management of currency, and oversight of defence, internal security, external relations, and diplomatic missions. This is understandable, as Madison had long back observed in The Federalist Papers, no. 43, that a capital city in a federal polity needs to be a federal (union) district (territory) for the purpose of keeping it insulated from the influence of any one state government.
Starting as a Part C state in the first schedule of the 1950 constitution, the Legislative Assembly of Delhi, unlike the other states in the same category, did not possess jurisdiction over all the subjects mentioned in the state and concurrent lists of the seventh schedule. Issues pertaining to public order; police (including railway police); municipal corporation powers; local authority functions; improvement trusts; water supply; drainage; electricity; transport; and other public utility services were kept under the jurisdiction of the centre. This unequal standing among the Part C states persisted until first November 1956, when the Assembly was dissolved and Delhi once again became a Chief Commissioner라이브 바카라 Province, as it was in colonial India since 1911. Subsequently, the Delhi Administration Act of 1966 made provision for the Metropolitan Council with a composition of 56 elected and five nominated members. This was merely a deliberative forum headed by the lieutenant governor. This arrangement persisted until 1990, when the 69th Amendment to the Constitution in 1991, implemented in 1993, introduced Article 239AA, which redefined the Union Territory of Delhi as the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Under the Act, the Legislative Assembly was revived. It is given jurisdiction over all the state and concurrent subjects listed in the seventh schedule, except public order, police, and land-use planning. There is to be a seven-member Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head, which is to be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. The Lieutenant Governor, appointed by the centre, is to retain significant discretionary powers, delegated by the President, for fulfilling certain judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Like the governors of states, the lieutenant governor can reserve any bill passed by the assembly for presidential assent (Articles 239, 239AA, NCT of Delhi Act, 1991). The annual budget, before being introduced in the Assembly, is needed to have the prior recommendation of the President. This legal arrangement has continued for almost two decades now, making the administrative structure of Delhi unique when compared with the other seven union territories.
The union territory, divided into eleven districts, thirty-three tehsils, one hundred thirteen census towns, and one hundred ninety-two villages, is structured into three tiers: the central government, the state government, and the three municipal bodies: the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the New Delhi Municipal Committee, and the Delhi Cantonment Board. The Delhi Police, the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) report to the federal government. The Delhi Police administration, structured into two zones, six ranges, eleven districts and 184 police stations, works under the direct control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Likewise, the DDA reports to the Ministry of Urban Development. Further, the highest officials of the MCD, that is, the commissioner and the chairperson of the NDMC, are both selected by the union government. Though the MCD can pass rules and by-laws, these are subject to the approval of the Union Government that also fixes the wards, functions of its committees, and rules relating to electoral rolls. Several such powers have been passed on to the lieutenant governor, over which the elected government of Delhi has no control. It follows that the ultimate power of governance of the union territory comes under the jurisdiction of the union government, despite it having an elected government in place.
Thus, the Delhi administrative system appears to be highly centralised in terms of decision-making. At the same time, the multitude of authorities, as discussed above, results in jurisdictional issues and complicates the process of policy formulation, coordination, and implementation. The responsibility for development works and services deliveries overlaps among these various government units. This makes it difficult to fix accountability to a particular government, central or state.
It would be fair to argue that the unique administrative structure would come in the way of any party that comes to power in Delhi in running the administration effectively, despite winning the popular mandate. This would be especially so when there would be two different parties in power in the UT and at the centre. In such a situation, the contentious role of the centrally appointed lieutenant governors also becomes a factor that comes in the way of effective governance. This is what was the situation in the last decade, with the AAP being in power in the UT, pitted against the BJP government at the centre.
Summing Up
Dissecting the Delhi election verdict brings attention to the pitfalls of recklessly using economic populism rather than adhering to a programmatic effort to bring lasting welfare, as the electoral loss of the AAP testified. As for the electorates’ dissatisfaction with the much-touted “Delhi governance model”, it can partly be attributed to the unique administrative structure of the union territory, which needs rethinking and restructuring.
(Rekha Saxena and Ashutosh Kumar are both professors in the Department of Political Science respectively, of University of Delhi, Delhi and Panjab University, Chandigarh. The views expressed are personal)
