THINGS have changed since the last time Strobe Talbott set foot on Pakistani soil a few months ago. Nawaz Sharif was then at the height of his popularity. All his past follies had been forgotten and in him people saw a leader who would give a befitting reply to New Delhi. Today, Sharif is fighting for survival, with even his own cabinet members saying he has messed up the post-nuclear test scenario.
The military leadership has raised eyebrows at allegations that those close to Sharif were involved in taking out foreign currency from banks before a freeze was imposed. This fact was verified by finance minister Sartaj Aziz, who has promised to make public the names of the people who sent abroad millions of dollars.
With this background, the nuclear ball game in South Asia changed so quickly and drastically that the players had completely forgotten to frame new rules. So when the Americans came calling last week, this was one area that they wanted to take advantage of.
It is clear that Islamabad never had the time to psychologically adjust to the new reality of being a nuclear weapons state. Independent analysts say it was irrational to link signing of the CTBT with economic issues, as becoming party to it would not alter Pakistans position as a nuclear power. However, public opinion is against the signing of the CTBT immediately, even though these analysts caution that "neither Pakistan nor India will move to conduct more tests". There is also talk that Pakistan must adopt a two-pronged approach, conceding ground where it does not jeopardise its security interests while bargaining for nuclear concessions on treaties through negotiations.
It was only on the eve of Talbotts visit that Pakistan tried to put its act together. Though there is little Sharif and army chief Gen. Jehangir Karamat agree on these days, both emerged out of closed-door meetings saying Islamabad would not succumb to external pressure on signing the CTBT. They linked Pakistans stand with the depleting economic situation and overall regional security environment. "The present economic difficulties will prove short-lived. Pakistans top civil and military leaders say any coercive measures by the global community would be counter-productive," said a participant in the defence committee of the cabinet.
However, speaking to reporters at the end of Talbotts visit, foreign secretary Shamsad Ahmed categorically rejected signing the CTBT unless "theres a clear demonstration of effective engagement" by the major world powers on the whole process of peace and security in South Asia, "which must focus on Kashmir".
Despite this, if Talbott was hoping to extract concessions on the non-proliferation agenda, he was not entirely disappointed. Islamabad had signalled that it was ready to discuss all issues but nuclear deterrence would have to centre around Pakistans security. Even before the talks had finished, Washington started sending out appeasing signals promising economic relief. It had by now sensed there would be a limit to the arm-twisting,especially when the talks with Delhi had remained inconclusive.
One reaction after the talks was that Islamabad had given some indication of flexibility on CTBT but that the US had asked for a time-frame for this. The final outcome of any agreement with Washington would not only be reflected on Pakistans future security, in fact it would also be a question of the survival of Nawaz Sharif himself.
