IT was unprecedented, but not unexpected. On the third day (June 27) of US president Bill Clinton's muchhyped China tour, the two countries issued a joint statement specific to India and Pakistan. Besides expressing concern over the nuclear tests in the subcontinent and the subsequent increase in tension between India and Pakistan, it stressed that China and the US "shared interests in a stable and peaceful South Asia".
For this, the two nations would work closely together to "promote reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan". Apparently at the behest of the Chinese, the statement studiously ignored India's position that a deteriorating security environment in South Asia was the main reason for its tests as well as the direct reference to China in prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's post-tests letter to Clinton.
Also, in an attempt to prevent other wannabes from blasting their way to nuclear status, the statement denied India and Pakistan entry into the five-member nuclear club, while reiterating that they should "enter into firm commitments not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles capable of delivering them".
The Indian reaction was swift, unambiguous. Attacking the statement as "hegemonistic" and as a reflection of the "mentality of a bygone era", the MEA spokesperson said India "categorically rejects the notion of these two countries arrogating to themselves joint or individual responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability and security in the region".
"For India, it seems verbal responses matter more than actual action," feels Prof G.P. Deshpande, dean, school of international studies (SIS), JNU. "The joint statement was not unexpected, since China is still smarting from being labelled enemy no. 1. But while the Indian reaction may have been justified, we could have expressed the same sentiments in a milder tone, keeping more entry points open."
The perception that the joint statement implies the US and China will play an increasingly interventionist role in South Asia is not entirely correct, Deshpande notes. "The statement is just to indicate that they are capable of such intervention, and possibly will if necessary. It does not necessarily follow that they will. Our reaction should have been based on this."
The "revenge factor" also applies to the US, still smarting over its inability to predict or check the second round of tests, adds Kanti Bajpai, also of the SIS. This has been compounded by the "unhelpful" statements emanating out of India. However, he feels that these statements do not add up to much, simply because the US knows China does not have much capital with either India or Pakistan. "It seems that these nations are talking at, not to, each other," says Bajpai, who sees nothing new in the Indian statement. "They've wagged a finger at us, we've wagged a finger back."
The possibility of a more dominant US-China role in South Asia is limited, "although it does potentially free China to do anything here," he notes. What is of concern, however, is that the Indian tests may have brought Pakistan closer to China, and China closer to the US on some issues. Thereby reviving the nightmare of the '70s, when the US made no bones about Pakistan being its strategic ally in the region."On a more subterranean level, however, the US wants to curb Chinese proliferation, and what better way than to involve it publicly, on such a grand scale?" asks Bajpai.
Deshpande, however, says the Indian perception about the US-China-Pakistan axis is not entirely correct, given the inherent contradictions in Sino-US ties. "Possibly, China believes that we haven't progressed beyond tests, and that we will need to conduct more tests to weaponise. This is precisely what they want to halt. However, they cannot do this unless the US is also involved. George Fernandes' statements have made it easier for them paint themselves as the affected party. We should have instead used the inherent Sino-US contradictions to our advantage."
With this summit, adds Deshpande, China is announcing to the world that it has 'arrived'. And "since we are relatively a much weaker state, we have to use more diplomatic weapons, be more nimble-footed. We could have launched a diplomatic offensive, expressing our reservations over the joint statement, while reiterating that Delhi is still keen on bilateral discussions with Beijing on all issues." But then, there still may be time for that.
